Opportunity for Lebanon

It is with a great relief that the awkward war of Israel on the militia of Hizbollah (and due to the extent of the retaliations, a sheer aggression to Lebanon) has come to an end after a month and after a dreaded escalation that would have involved the whole Middle East did not happened. Of course if we have to draw some conclusions from this incident, the first of them would be to lament the victims, that apparently were uselessly sacrified for none of the contenders reached their outspoken goals, wether the destruction of the military power of Hizbollah or the destruction of Israel (obviously a retoric and irrealistic goal), and if a winner should come out, it would be indeed Hizbollah, who managed to stand to the massif attack of Israel, keeping its air attacks unchecked until the ceasefire (Resolution 1701) and thus having acquired a huge political capital as the new heroes of the opposition to Israel. The claim of Israel´s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, that the waged offensive would have nearly destroyed the stocks of Hizbollah´s rockets along with its launching facilities are nothing less than propaganda to counter critisicism of a bold and failed attack; if people would end up believing this version, they should rather thank Hizbollah´s keeping up to the ceasefire and not showing the opposite by resuming its attacks, which is indeed quite paradoxal. However the situation that comes out from this new "mini arab-israeli" war is more complex than propaganda (whatever the side) would like, and it might be Lebanon the winner, if both Hizbollah and Israel will abstain from undermining a process to be that could develop in the present context.

If we analise the origin of the attack, the incursion (something usual since 2000) of Hizbollah into Israel and the kidnapping of two soldiers, was not meant to atract such a heavy and disproportioned retaliation, the goal would have been just to enable a swap of prisoners (as the most hawkish politicians like Ariel Sharon indulged to) and not to provoke further indiscretion. What Hizbollah misunderstood was the signal that the new israeli goverment felt compelled to send to its citizens due to the increasingly unsure situation (mainly the rise of the iranian threat) and the doubts about a "civilian" government to carry out such controversial projects as an unilateral withdrawal from Palestinia, that in no way allowed weaknesses; and a retaliation as the one Lebanon had to suffer clearly sought to make up for the apparent weakness of Israel. It could also be discussed wether the use of such indiscriminated attacks sought to convey the impression that Israel was acting irrationally and thus further scare its ennemies, but such discussion would go beyond the scope of the article. The goals of the attack (push for the release of the kidnapped soldiers and later distroy Hizbollah) have failed, although it is clear that Hizbollah will surely not act so lightly in the future.
But if we could draw more positive conclusion it would be taking the point of view of the main victim of this war: Lebanon. Although this might look paradoxal, there are reasons to believe that all the civil victims might not have been slaughtered in vain, for it is this very brutality, that has horrofied a country that did not deserved such havoc, that could be positive; the reason is simply that it has cohesioned the country behind an actor, Hizbollah, that although not really fighting for Lebanon (rather not caring about harming it) turned into a simbol of resistance against the aggression. If Israel had just attacked South Lebanon, it is possible that the christian and sunni communities had decried Hizbollah and Syria as trouble bringers, but its pervasive and global attack on the whole country partly erased the distance between communities and brought forward, although very faintly, the illusion of a lebanese country and a united lebanese citizenship. And in fact Hizbollah might have restaured the great shortcoming of Lebanon, its capacity to respond to external attacks, what is functional to any state that wants to be considered as such in the international society.
Once that Lebanon has felt for the first time in its short and tragic history that a lebanese actor was assuming the competences of the armed forces and that, with success, the main challenge now is to uphold the cohesive effect before it withers away and lays under the tedious inter-communitarian grudges. How? Obviously, Israel should refrain from any further attack that might break the still weak balance, while of course Hizbollah should also keep up to the conditions of the ceasefire. It is equally useless to mention that Hizbollah´s armed presence must come, sooner or later, to an end, for in the future no other actor than the lebanese armed forces are to defend the country. The solution should be twofold:

First, Hizbollah should be aknowledged for the defense of the country, while not stressing too much on the fact that the deflagration was initiated irresponsably by its bold actions, what could make the militia feel more integrated in the national politics; but instead of upgrading Hizbollah as a "special actor" of Lebanon, they should understand that the gift given to their country, the capacity of self-defense, is something that must belong to all lebanese and that will have no positive value if kept as a particular bounty. Summing up, the particular action of Hizbollah will be fully universal if they yield their victory to Lebanon; if they keep it for themselves, they would distroy the illusion of cohesive citicenship standing against a foreign ennemy, what would harm them in the long run.

Second, Syria should be integrated in a global negotiation that includes a bilaterally agreed withdrawal from the heights of Golan under the condition that they force Hizbollah to yield their power to a fully democratic Lebanon. Israel should not be scared by the prospect of seeing Hizbollah as a fully recognized actor in Lebanon if reaching the peace.

Hopefully this will come out from the process initiated within the frame of the resolution 1701, although knowing the preceding history in the region there is scarce ground for optimism. Let us hope this will be a forbearing exception.